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This paper discusses the inﬂuences on food and farming of an increasingly urbanized world and a
declining ratio of food producers to food consumers. Urbanization has been underpinned by the
rapid growth in the world economy and in the proportion of gross world product and of workers
in industrial and service enterprises. Globally, agriculture has met the demands from this rapidly
growing urban population, including food that is more energy-, land-, water- and greenhouse gas
emission-intensive. But hundreds of millions of urban dwellers suffer under-nutrition. So the key
issues with regard to agriculture and urbanization are whether the growing and changing demands
for agricultural products from growing urban populations can be sustained while at the same time
underpinning agricultural prosperity and reducing rural and urban poverty. To this are added the
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to build resilience in agriculture and urban develop-
ment to climate change impacts. The paper gives particular attention to low- and middle-income
nations since these have more than three-quarters of the world’s urban population and most of
its largest cities and these include nations where issues of food security are most pressing.
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1. INTRODUCTION
(a) Key global changes
In 1900, worldwide, there were 6.7 rural dwellers to
each urban dweller; now there is less than one and pro-
jections suggest close to three urban dwellers to two
rural dwellers by 2025. This has been underpinned
by the rapid growth in the world economy and in the
proportion of gross world product and of the economic-
ally active population working in industry and
services (since most industrial and service enterprises
are in urban areas). Globally, agricultural production
has managed to meet the demands from a rapid
growth in the proportion of the workforce not
producing food and rapid changes in food demands
towards more energy- and greenhouse gas emission-
intensive food. However, hundreds of millions of
urban dwellers face under-nutrition today, although
this is far more related to their lack of income than to
a lack of capacity to produce food. There is a very
large urban population worldwide with incomes so
low that their health and nutritional status are at risk
from any staple food price rise—as became evident
with the rising hunger among urban populations after
the food price rises in 2007 and the ﬁrst half of 2008
(Cohen & Garrett 2009).
Much is made of the fact that in 2008, the world’s
urban population exceeded its rural population for
the ﬁrst time. Less attention has been given to two
other transitions: around 1980, the economically
active population employed in industry and services
exceeded that employed in the primary sector (agricul-
ture, forestry, mining and ﬁshing); and around 1940,
the economic value generated by industry and services
exceeded that generated by the primary sector
(Satterthwaite 2007). Today, agriculture provides the
livelihoods for around one-third of the world’s labour
force and generates 2–3% of global value added—
although this is misleading in that a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of industry and services are related to the
production, processing, distribution and sale of food,
and other agricultural products. In addition, the
ﬁgure might be higher if the value of food produced
by rural and urban dwellers for their own consumption
is taken into account.
UN projections suggest that the world’s urban
population will grow by more than a billion people
between 2010 and 2025, while the rural population
will hardly grow at all (United Nations 2008). It is
likely that the proportion of the global population
not producing food will continue to grow, as will the
number of middle and upper income consumers
whose dietary choices are more energy- and greenhouse
gas emission-intensive (and often more land-intensive)
and where such changes in demand also bring major
changes in agriculture and in the supply chain.
Two key demographic changes currently under way
and likely to continue in the next few decades are the
decline in population growth rates and the ageing of
the population. An ageing population in wealthier
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live in ‘rural’ areas, but this is best understood not as
deurbanization but as the urbanization of rural areas;
most such people will also cluster around urban
centres with advanced medical services and other
services that they want and value.
(b) Deﬁnition of urbanization
The precise demographic deﬁnition of urbanization is
the increasing share of a nation’s population living in
urban areas (and thus a declining share living in
rural areas). Most urbanization is the result of net
rural to urban migration. The level of urbanization is
the share itself, and the rate of urbanization is the
rate at which that share is changing. This deﬁnition
makes the implications of urbanization distinct from
those of urban population growth or those of the phys-
ical expansion of urban areas, both of which are often
treated as synonymous with urbanization.
A nation’s urban population can grow from natural
increase (births minus deaths), net rural to urban
migration and reclassiﬁcation (as what was previously
a rural settlement becomes classiﬁed as urban or as
an urban settlement’s boundaries are expanded, bring-
ing into its population people who were previously
classiﬁed as rural). Nations with rapid economic
growth and relatively low rates of natural increase
such as China over the past few decades have most
of their urban population growth from urbanization;
nations with little or no economic growth and high
rates of natural increase (including many sub-Saharan
African nations during the 1990s) have most of their
urban population growth from natural increase (see
Potts 2009). Differences in rural and urban rates of
natural increase (inﬂuenced by differences in fertility
and mortality rates) also inﬂuence urbanization,
although generally these act to reduce urbanization.
The term urbanization is also used for the expan-
sion of urban land uses. The conventional deﬁnition
for urbanization used in this paper entails a shift in
settlement patterns from dispersed to more dense
settlement. By way of contrast, much of the expansion
of urban land use is the result of a shift from dense to
more dispersed settlement. In effect, the term urban-
ization is being used to refer to two opposing spatial
shifts in settlement patterns, likely to have opposing
effects on, for example, the land available for agriculture.
2. THE SCALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE
WORLD’S URBAN POPULATION
(a) Background
Many development professionals see urbanization as a
problem. Yet, no nation has prospered without urban-
ization and there is no prosperous nation that is not
predominantly urban. Over the past 60 years, there
is a strong association between economic growth and
urbanization and most of the world’s poorest nations
remain among the least urbanized nations. Urban
areas provide many potential advantages for improving
living conditions through the economies of scale and
proximity they provide for most forms of infrastructure
and services. This can be seen in the high life expect-
ancies evident in the best governed European, Asian
and North and South American cities. Urbanization
over the past two centuries has also been associated
with pro-poor social reforms in which collective organ-
ization by the urban poor has had important roles
(Mitlin 2008).
But there are still very serious development prob-
lems in many urban areas, including high levels of
urban poverty and serious problems of food security
and of high infant and child mortality. Many urban
areas in sub-Saharan Africa also have very high preva-
lence rates for HIV/AIDs; where there are large urban
populations unable to get required treatments and a
lack of programmes to protect those most at risk,
these increase urban mortality rates signiﬁcantly (van
Donk 2006). But it is not urbanization that is the
cause of such problems but the inadequacies in the
response by governments and international agencies.
In most nations, the pace of economic and urban
change has outstripped the pace of needed social and
political reform, especially at local government level.
The consequences of this are evident in most cities
in Asia and Africa and many in Latin America and
the Caribbean—the high proportion of the population
living in very poor and overcrowded conditions in
informal settlements or tenements lacking adequate
provision for water, sanitation, drainage, healthcare,
s c h o o l sa n dt h er u l eo fl a w .T h i si se v i d e n te v e ni n
cities where there has been very rapid economic
growth. The fact that half of Mumbai’s or Nairobi’s
population live in ‘slums and squatter settlements’ is
more to do with political choices than a lack of resources.
Little more than a century ago, most ‘slums’ in
Europe and North America had living conditions,
and infant and child mortality rates that were as bad
as the worst-governed cities in low-income nations
today. Here too there were problems of under-
nutrition, lack of education and serious problems
with exploitation, as well as deeply entrenched dis-
crimination against women in almost all aspects of
life. It was social and political reforms that dramatic-
ally reduced these. And social and political reforms
are addressing these in many middle-income nations
today—as in Thailand, Brazil and Tunisia where
housing and living conditions, basic service provision
and nutritional standards have improved considerably
for large sections of the low-income urban population.
(b) An urbanizing world
The world’s urban population today is around 3.2 bil-
lion people
1—more than the world’s total population
in 1960. Many aspects of urban change in recent dec-
ades are unprecedented, including the world’s level of
urbanization and the size of its urban population, the
number of countries becoming more urbanized and
the size and number of very large cities.
But these urban statistics tell us nothing about the
large economic, social, political and demographic
changes that underpinned them. These include the
multiplication in the size of the world’s economy, the
shift in economic activities and employment structures
from agriculture to industry and services (and within
services to information production and exchange),
and the virtual disappearance of colonial empires.
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change but many of the world’s largest cities had
more people moving out than in during their last
inter-census period.
2 The increasing number of
‘mega cities’ with 10 million or more inhabitants
may seem to be a cause for concern but there are rela-
tively few of them (17 by 2000), they concentrate less
than 5 per cent of the world’s population and most are
in the world’s largest economies. Although rapid
urbanization is seen as a problem, generally, the
more urbanized a nation, the higher the average life
expectancy and the literacy rate and the stronger the
democracy, especially at local level. Of course,
beyond all these quantitative measures, cities are also
centres of culture, of heritage, of social, cultural and
political innovation. Some of world’s fastest growing
cities over the past 50 years also have among the best
standards of living within their nation.
It is also important not to overstate the speed of
urban change. Rates of urbanization and of urban
population growth slowed in most sub-regions of the
world during the 1990s. Mexico City had 18 million
people in 2000, not the 31 million predicted 25 years
previously. Kolkata (formerly Calcutta), Sao Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro, Seoul, Chennai (formerly Madras)
and Cairo are among the many other large cities
that, by 2000, had several million fewer inhabitants
than had been predicted.
There are also signiﬁcant changes in the distri-
bution of the world’s urban population between
regions (table 1). In 1950, Europe and Northern
America had more than half the world’s urban popu-
lation; by 2000, they had little more than a quarter.
Asia now has half the world’s urban population.
Some caution is needed when comparing urban
trends between nations because of deﬁciencies in the
statistical base. Accurate statistics for nations’ urban
population and urbanization levels depend on accurate
censuses.
3 But in some nations, there has been no
census for the past 15–20 years. It is also difﬁcult to
compare the current population of most of the
world’s largest cities because each city has at least
three different ﬁgures for their populations, depending
on whether it is the city (or built-up area), the metro-
politan area or a wider planning (or administrative)
region that is being considered—or whether the city
population includes the inhabitants of settlements
with a high proportion of daily commuters. Also,
there are signiﬁcant differences between nations in
how urban centres are deﬁned, which limits the val-
idity of international comparisons for urbanization
levels. China’s level of urbanization in 1999 could
have been 24%, 31% or 73%, depending on which
of three ofﬁcial deﬁnitions of urban populations was
used (Zhang 2004). If India adopted the urban deﬁn-
ition used in the UK or Sweden, its urbanization level
would increase very considerably as many of its ‘large
villages’ would be reclassiﬁed as urban centres.
(c) The change in the scale for large cities
Two aspects of the rapid growth in the world’s urban
population are the increase in the number of large
cities and the historically unprecedented size of the
largest cities. In 1800, there were two ‘million-cities’
(cities with one million or more inhabitants)—
London and Beijing (then called Peking); by 2000,
there were 378. In 2000, the average size of the
world’s 100 largest cities was 6.3 million inhabitants,
compared with 2 million inhabitants in 1950 and 0.7
million in 1900.
(d) De-urbanization and shrinking cities
De-urbanization is a decrease in the proportion of the
population living in urban areas. During the 1970s, in
various high-income nations, there appeared to be a
reversal of long-established urbanization trends
nationally or within some regions as there was net
migration from large to small urban centres or
from urban to rural areas. This was labelled counter-
urbanization, although much of it is more accurately
described as demetropolitanization because it was
population shifts from large metropolitan centres to
smaller urban centres or from central cities to suburbs
or commuter communities. Some of the ‘smaller cities’
that attracted large migration ﬂows grew sufﬁciently to
become metropolitan centres—so this was a shift from
old to new metropolitan centres.
This was not underpinned by a shift in the work-
force back to agriculture but by the growth of the
labour force in industry and services that could live
in small urban centres or rural areas and commute to
work. In addition, with advanced transport and com-
munication facilities, a proportion of new investment
in industry and services could locate in rural areas.
Telecommuting allows work to be done and incomes
earned in rural areas, even if the work is for a city-
based enterprise. This is best understood not as
de-urbanization but as the urbanization of rural
areas. Here, most rural households enjoy levels of pro-
vision for infrastructure and services that have been
historically associated with urban centres; many are
also within (say) 1 h of central-city theatres, cinemas,
museums, art galleries, restaurants and shops. This
phenomenon is also seen in the fact that many high-
income nations have only 1–2% of their labour force
in agriculture when 15–30% of their population live
in rural areas.
Historically, there are examples of de-urbanization
where the proportion of the economically active popu-
lation working in agriculture increased, especially as
nations faced economic or political crises or during
wars (Bairoch 1988; Clark 2009). In the past 50
years, various nations de-urbanized for particular
periods driven by central planning and force (for
instance in Cambodia, Vietnam and parts of China).
In the past two decades, some regions in sub-Saharan
Africa de-urbanized or had no urbanization, largely in
response to economic crisis and to structural adjust-
ment (Potts 2009). Others that have had wars or
long-running conﬂicts may have de-urbanized, unless
those ﬂeeing these conﬂicts went to urban areas.
The term de-urbanization has also been applied to
particular cities that lose population. This is confusing
in that there are always changes in any nation’s urban
system as some urban centres are more successful
than others at attracting or retaining investment.
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past three decades, underpinned by rapid economic
growth, and it has many rapidly growing cities but
also some that have had declining populations. In
the United States and Europe, many of the great
nineteenth and early twentieth century ports and
steel, textile and mining centres have lost economic
importance and population (Pallagst et al. 2009); so
too have some of the major manufacturing cities—
for instance, Detroit as a centre of motor vehicle
production. These are not associated with a shift
in the economically active population to agriculture
but with locational shifts in where new investments
are going.
3. THE FUTURE FOR URBANIZATION AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR FARMING
(a) Introduction
We need to understand what has underpinned urban-
ization in the past and how this is changing and might
change in the future to be able to consider its impli-
cations for agriculture and food production. The
history of urbanization and of the cities and towns it
encompasses is a history of political strength and econ-
omic success. The spatial distribution of towns and
cities is in effect the geography of the non-agricultural
economy since it is where industrial and service
enterprises have chosen to locate. It is also a map of
where people working outside agriculture, forestry or
ﬁshing make a living. Changes in this spatial distri-
bution reﬂect changes not only in the economy but
also in how this is organized—for instance, how this
is inﬂuenced by the growth of multinational corpor-
ations and how they are structured, by shifts in
goods production to greater use of out-sourcing and
by economic changes underpinned by advanced
telecommunications including the Internet.
The rural to urban migration ﬂows that cause
urbanization are mostly a response to these economic
changes. Some migration ﬂows might be considered
exceptions—for instance, growth in places where
Table 1. The distribution of the world’s urban population by region, 1950–2020. Derived from statistics in United Nations
(2008).
region or country 1950 1970 1990 2000 projected for 2010 projected for 2020
urban populations (millions of inhabitants)
world 737 1332 2275 2854 3495 4210
high-income nations 427 652 818 873 925 972
low- and middle-income nations 310 680 1456 1981 2570 3237
‘least developed countries’ 15 41 110 169 254 376
Africa 33 86 204 295 412 566
Asia 237 485 1015 1373 1770 2212
Europe 281 412 509 520 530 540
Latin America and the Caribbean 69 164 314 394 471 543
Northern America 110 171 214 250 286 321
Oceania 8 14 19 22 25 28
urbanization level (% of population living in urban areas)
world 29.1 36.0 43.0 46.6 50.6 54.9
high-income nations 52.5 64.6 71.2 73.1 75.0 77.5
low- and middle-income nations 18.0 25.3 35.1 40.2 45.3 50.5
‘least developed countries’ 7.3 13.1 21.0 24.8 29.4 35.0
Africa 14.5 23.6 32.0 35.9 39.9 44.6
Asia 16.8 22.7 31.9 37.1 42.5 48.1
Europe 51.2 62.8 70.5 71.4 72.6 74.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 41.4 57.0 70.6 75.3 79.4 82.3
Northern America 63.9 73.8 75.4 79.1 82.1 84.6
Oceania 62.0 70.8 70.6 70.4 70.6 71.4
% of the world’s urban population living in
world 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
high-income nations 58.0 49.0 36.0 30.6 26.5 23.1
low- and middle-income nations 42.0 51.0 64.0 69.4 73.5 76.9
‘least developed countries’ 2.0 3.1 4.9 5.9 7.3 8.9
Africa 4.4 6.5 9.0 10.3 11.8 13.5
Asia 32.1 36.4 44.6 48.1 50.6 52.5
Europe 38.1 30.9 22.4 18.2 15.2 12.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 9.4 12.3 13.8 13.8 13.5 12.9
Northern America 14.9 12.9 9.4 8.8 8.2 7.6
Oceania 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7
China 9.8 10.9 13.8 15.9 17.4 18.0
India 8.6 8.2 9.7 10.1 10.5 11.2
USA 13.7 11.6 8.5 7.9 7.4 6.9
Brazil 2.6 4.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.7
Russian Federation 6.2 6.1 4.8 3.8 2.9 2.3
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this also reﬂects economic change because of the
growth in enterprises there to meet the demand for
goods and services generated by the retired people
and/or tourists.
This close association between urbanization and
political strength and economic success is not likely
to change looking to the future, although the countries
and regions that enjoy the greatest success will change.
Economic success for most cities may depend more
today on success in global markets than 50 years ago,
although intense inter-city competition for markets
beyond national boundaries has been an inﬂuence
for most cities for many centuries (Bairoch 1988;
Clark 2009). Urbanization has also been underpinned
by the expansion of the state, although the scale of this
depends on economic success. In addition, competent,
accountable urban governments have considerable
importance for economic success. Today, many of
the world’s largest cities are large not because they
are political capitals but because of their economic
success.
How urbanization is understood has large impli-
cations for how its likely future inﬂuence on food and
farming is perceived. If urbanization is regarded as a
process taking place in almost all nations and as a
driver of change, then it can be assumed that ex-
trapolating past trends provides us with a likely
picture of the world’s future urban population. This is
backed up by projections for all nations for their
urban populations and their levels of urbanization up
to 2025 and beyond (United Nations 2008). These
suggest that almost all nations continue to urbanize
except for those already classiﬁed as 100 per cent
urban. Within this assumption of almost universal
increases in urbanization, often there are references to
urbanization being out of control because it seems to
take place regardless of economic conditions. There
is also uncertainty as to how to ﬁt examples of
de-urbanization into this broad picture of a world with
almost all nations becoming increasingly urbanized.
But if urbanization is understood as a process that is
deeply inﬂuenced by the scale and nature of economic,
social and political change (see for instance Hasan
2006), then projections up to 2025 and beyond
become more uncertain. How does one predict the
absolute and relative economic performance of each
nation up to 2025? Within this understanding of
urbanization, there is an interest in the links between
urbanization and economic change (which prove to
be robust and multi-faceted). Since the scale and
nature of economic change varies so much between
nations and within nations, there is an interest here
in how differences in economic change are associated
with (and often the main cause of) differences in the
scale and nature of urban change (including urbani-
zation). De-urbanization is more easily incorporated
into this, as a spatial manifestation of economic
decline or collapse. This paper suggests that there is
a substantial but often overlooked evidence base for
this second interpretation of urbanization—and that
this also provides a more reliable basis for considering
the current and future inﬂuence of urbanization on
food and farming.
(b) The economic drivers of urbanization
In low- and middle-income nations, urbanization is
overwhelmingly the result of people moving in
response to better economic opportunities in urban
areas, or to the lack of prospects in their home farms
or villages. The scale and direction of people’s move-
ments accord well with changes in the spatial
location of economic opportunities. Although it is
often assumed that most migration is from rural to
urban areas, in many nations rural-to-rural, urban-
to-rural and urban-to-urban migration ﬂows are also
important.
That much of the migration over the past 60 years has
been from rural to urban areas is hardly surprising in
that most of the growth in economic activities over this
period has been in urban centres. Today, around 97
per cent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP)
is generated by industry and services, and around 65
per cent of the world’s economically active population
works in industry and services—and a very high pro-
portion of all industry and services are in urban areas.
The graphs in ﬁgure 1 show how changes in urban-
ization levels reﬂect changes in the proportion of GDP
generated by industry and services and the proportion
of the workforce in industry and services.
(c) Urbanization and the global economy
Many cities owe their prosperity to their roles within
the increasingly internationalized system of production
and distribution. International, national and local
tourism have also proved important underpinnings in
many cities and smaller urban centres. There is an
economic logic underlying the distribution of the
world’s largest cities. For instance, the world’s ﬁve lar-
gest economies in 2000 had 44 per cent of the world’s
‘million cities’ and eight of the world’s 17 megacities;
most of the other large cities and megacities were
within the next 15 largest economies.
There is also an obvious association between most
of the world’s largest cities and globalization. Growing
cross-border ﬂows of raw materials, goods, information,
income and capital, much of it managed by trans-
national corporations, have underpinned a network of
‘global cities’ that are the key sites for the management
and servicing of the global economy (Sassen 2006).
Many of the world’s fastest growing cities are also the
cities that have had most success in attracting
international investment. Large international migration
ﬂows, and consequent remittance ﬂows, are also associ-
ated with globalization and have profound impacts on
many cities—in areas of both origin and destination.
Around 175 million people (more than 2% of the
world’s population) live in a country in which they
were not born (Boswell & Crisp 2004).
However, the association between globalization
and large cities is moderated by two factors. The
ﬁrst is that advanced telecommunications systems
and corporate structures allow a separation of the
production process from those who manage and
ﬁnance it. The second factor, linked to the ﬁrst, is
the more decentralized pattern of urban development
that is possible within regions with well-developed
transport and communications infrastructure. Many
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are less dominated by a large central city, and have
new enterprises developing in a network of smaller
cities and greenﬁeld sites (Castells & Hall 1994).
This is usually underpinned by a growing capacity
among cities outside the large metropolitan areas to
attract a signiﬁcant proportion of new investment,
which in turn has been supported by decentralization
where local governments’ capacities and accountability
to citizens were increased.
(d) Urbanization and food and agriculture
Urbanization brings major changes in demand for
agricultural products both from increases in urban
populations and from changes in their diets and
demands. This has brought and continues to bring
major changes in how demands are met and in the
farmers, companies, corporations, and local and
national economies who beneﬁt (and who lose out).
It can also bring major challenges for urban and
rural food security.
But it is misleading to consider this in general terms
for ‘developing countries’ as if current or likely future
changes in (say) Argentina and Chile have anything in
common with (say) Mauritania and Burkina Faso. To
predict changes for each nation is difﬁcult, in large
part because of uncertainties as to how much and
where urban populations will grow in the future. It is
usually assumed that most ‘developing nations’ will
continue urbanizing but many low-income nations
currently lack any area of comparative advantage
within the global economy and so also the basis for
the prosperity needed to underpin urbanization (see
Satterthwaite 2007; Potts 2009). It is often assumed
that there are particularly serious problems with serv-
ing growing numbers of ‘megacities’ (cities of over
10 million inhabitants) but as noted already, there
are relatively few of them, and in many nations a
more decentralized pattern of urban growth was evi-
dent in the last round of censuses taken in 2000; it
will be interesting to see if this is a trend that has
been sustained when data from the current round of
censuses become available.
It is worth considering likely changes at two differ-
ent ends of the spectrum in terms of nations’ economic
success. It would be expected that in nations with
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Figure 1. Changes in the proportion of GDP from industry and services, of the labour force working in industry and services
and of the population in urban areas, 1950–2005. Diamonds, % GDP from industry and services; squares, % labour force in
industry and services; dashed lines, level of urbanization. Source: Satterthwaite (2007).
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will be rising demands for meat, dairy products, veg-
etable oils and ‘luxury’ foods, and this implies more
energy-intensive production and, for many nations,
more imports (de Haen et al. 2003). Urbanization is
also associated with dietary shifts towards more pro-
cessed and pre-prepared foods, in part in response to
long working hours and, for a proportion of the
urban population, with reduced physical activity
(Popkin 2001; de Haen et al. 2003). Of course, food
demand will also be inﬂuenced by how this economic
growth changes the distribution of income.
How will this inﬂuence agriculture around or close
to growing urban centres will also vary; it would be
expected that a growing role for supermarkets (and
transnational corporations) in food sales would bring
changes in all aspects of the food chain. This would
include favouring larger (and often non-local) agricul-
tural producers and major changes in the distribution
and marketing of food (Kennedy et al. 2004). This
also means a shift in employment within the food
system, with fewer people working in agriculture and
more working in transport, wholesaling, retailing,
food processing and vending (Cohen & Garrett 2009).
The high proportion of urban households with elec-
tricity in middle-income and some low-income nations
also means far more households with refrigeration and
this supports shifts in food demand (Reardon et al.
2003). Many low- and middle-income nations are
likely to have a growing share of urban food demand
met by imported food and by the kinds of shifts in
agriculture evident in high-income nations over the
past few decades towards more capital- and energy-
intensive and less labour-intensive farming. But grow-
ing demand from high-income urban dwellers or from
tourists may also support the growth of a range of
high-value food crops that provide more scope for
many local farms (and smaller farmers) and may
have valuable multiplier links within the local econ-
omy. This includes more scope for urban and peri-
urban agriculture (see §4c). It is difﬁcult to predict
how this will change—for instance, if there is a sus-
tained increase in the price of oil and natural gas,
this might provide local agricultural producers with
some advantages in meeting local demands as their
production and transport to market is less carbon-
intensive, or disadvantage local producers that were
serving foreign markets (for instance, high-value
crops that are exported by air).
At the other end of the spectrum, there is a very
large urban population in nations or sub-national
regions lacking prosperous economies where demand
for agricultural products is likely to change much
less. There are many nations where most of the
urban population still has no electricity (Legros et al.
2009) and where the proﬁts to be made in food retail-
ing are too small to attract large corporations. In
Africa, multinational chains have yet to reach poor
urban neighbourhoods and have little presence in
poorer countries (Weatherspoon & Reardon 2003).
In addition, a very large part of the urban population
in both prosperous and unprosperous low- and
middle-income nations have incomes so low that
they struggle to meet their basic nutritional needs.
(e) Does the rural population suffer from an
urban bias in development?
Given the concentration of economic opportunity in
urban areas, it might be expected that urban popu-
lations would have much better living standards,
levels of nutrition and service provision than rural
populations. The concentration of powerful economic
interests and wealthier groups in particular urban areas
would be expected to produce a bias that favoured
them. But it would be misleading to term this urban
bias if it favours only a proportion of the urban popu-
lation. The scale and depth of urban poverty in low-
and middle-income nations hardly suggests that every-
one beneﬁts from an urban bias. It is common for
between one-third and one-half of the population in
cities to live in illegal settlements lacking adequate pro-
vision for water, sanitation, healthcare and schools.
Their homes and livelihoods are at risk from evic-
tion—and tens of millions of urban dwellers are
evicted from their homes each year, mostly with no
compensation or very inadequate compensation
(du Plessis 2005). The large and growing scale of
urban poverty in China is a reminder of how very
rapid economic growth sustained over 25 years does
not automatically translate into less urban poverty
(Solinger 2006). The same is true for some of India’s
most prosperous cities. In addition, the scale and
depth of urban poverty is usually underestimated by
ofﬁcial statistics because of inadequate allowance
made in setting poverty lines for the costs that low-
income city dwellers face for non-food necessities,
such as rent, water, access to toilets, healthcare, fuel
and keeping children at school (Satterthwaite 2004).
4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF URBANIZATION FOR
FOOD PRODUCTION
(a) Urbanization and the loss of agricultural land
Urban expansion inevitably covers some agricultural
land while changes in land values and land markets
around cities often result in land left vacant as the
owners anticipate the gains they will make from selling
it or using it for non-agricultural uses. In most urban
areas in low- and middle-income nations, the absence
of any land-use plan or strategic planning framework
to guide land-use changes means that urban areas
expand haphazardly. This expansion is determined
by where different households, enterprises and public
sector activities locate and build, legally or illegally.
In most instances, there is little effective control over
land-use conversions from agriculture to non-agricul-
tural uses. There may be regulations that are meant
to limit this but these are often avoided by politicians
and real estate interests (Hardoy et al. 2001). This
unregulated physical expansion brings many serious
consequences. These include the segregation of
low-income groups in illegal settlements on the
worst-located and the most hazardous sites (they
would not be permitted to settle on better-located
and safer sites) and a patchwork of high- and low-
density land uses to which it is both expensive and
difﬁcult to provide infrastructure and services.
Urban centres often expand over their nation’s most
productive agricultural land since most urban centres
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Most of the world’s major cities today have been
important cities for several hundred years, so they
became important cities before the development of
motorized transport (and later refrigeration) that
reduced cities’ dependence on their surroundings for
food and other agricultural products. Of course, for
prosperous cities, the demand for agricultural com-
modities has long-since gone far beyond what is or
could be produced in their surroundings. They draw
on large and complex global supply chains and have
large ecological footprints, drawing on ‘distant else-
wheres’ for food, fuel and carbon sinks (Rees 1992).
The dependence of many very large concentrations
of urban populations on long international supply
chains for food, fuels and most intermediate and
ﬁnal goods makes them vulnerable to disasters in
locations that supply these or buy their products, and
also to rising fuel prices.
However, the loss of agricultural land to the spatial
expansion of urban areas is often exaggerated; one
recent study suggested that only West Europe among
the world’s regions has more than 1 per cent of its
land area as urban (Schneider et al. 2009). In addition,
a declining proportion of land used for agriculture
around a city may be accompanied by more intensive
production for land that remains in agriculture (see
Bentinck 2000) or intensive urban agriculture on
land not classiﬁed as agricultural. In most locations,
governments could and should restrict the loss of agri-
cultural land to urban expansion. But this can also
bring serious social consequences if it pushes up land
and house prices and reduces still further the pro-
portion of households that can afford a legal housing
plot with infrastructure.
Approximately 25 per cent of the world’s terrestrial
surface is occupied by cultivated land (Cassman et al.
2005). Urban growth is more likely to reduce arable
land availability if it takes place in this zone. But an
analysis of the percentage of urban and rural popu-
lation in the cultivated zones in each region found
no evidence of urban populations concentrated in
cultivated zones (Balk et al. 2008).
Of course, the expansion of urban land uses is not
just the result of urbanization but also (in most
cities) of natural increase and of declining urban den-
sities (Angel et al. 2005). Since urbanization entails
fewer rural people as well as more urban people, it
may reduce rural building and so, in part, counteract
the effects of urbanization expanding over cultivated
land.
(b) Does urbanization result in more
land-intensive diets?
Dietary changes can increase pressures on agricultural
systems, with increasing meat consumption the most
important example of this. Diets differ between rural
and urban areas, and meat consumption per capita is
higher in urban areas. But a review of the relationship
between urbanization and food prices suggests that
this may be the result of higher urban incomes and
not urbanization or urban living, as higher income
rural dwellers have similar levels of increased meat
consumption or of luxury goods to higher income
urban dwellers (Stage et al. 2010). For instance, in
Sri Lanka, there is considerable diversity in the expen-
ditures on meat per household in different parts of the
country, but the difference between median rural and
median urban households conforms roughly to what
might be expected given the differences in average
income. In Vietnam, data from 1993 to 2004 show
that all parts of the country experienced rapid
income growth and increasing consumption of luxury
foods, in a pattern that suggests that income, not
urban living, is the driving force (Stage et al. 2010).
(c) Urban agriculture
Hundreds of millions of urban dwellers rely on urban
agriculture for part of their food consumption or
income as they sell high-value crops or non-food
crops or raise livestock for sale (Smit et al. 1996;
Redwood 2009). A range of studies in urban centres
in East Africa during the 1990s showed 17–36% of
the population growing crops and/or keeping livestock
(Lee-Smith 2010). These studies also showed the
diversity among urban farmers—for instance, in Dar
es Salaam, they included professionals, teachers, gov-
ernment ofﬁcials, urban planners, students, casual
labourers, the unemployed and part-time workers
(Sawio 1994). Urban and peri-urban agriculture has
a signiﬁcant role in food and nutrition security in
most low-income nations, although in many cities it
is more difﬁcult for the urban poor to get access to
the land needed for agriculture (Smit et al. 1996;
Lee-Smith 2010).
(d) Does urbanization imply less hunger and
malnutrition?
Although urbanization is generally associated with
economic growth, this does not mean that the
number of urban dwellers facing hunger has declined
in all nations. A study of 10 nations in sub-Saharan
Africa showed that the proportion of the urban popu-
lation with energy deﬁciencies was above 40 per cent
in all but one nation and above 60 per cent in three
(Ruel & Garrett 2004). In 12 of 18 low-income
countries, food-energy deﬁciencies in urban areas
were the same or higher than rural areas, even
though urban areas have higher average incomes
(Ahmed et al. 2007).
The rapid increases in food prices during 2007 and
early 2008 showed the vulnerability of the urban poor
to price rises. Although there has been some decline in
prices since mid-2008, most analysts believe that
prices will not return to the levels of the early 2000s
because of continued strong demand for energy and
for cereals for food, feed and fuel, as well as to
structural land and water constraints and likely
food production impacts of climate change (Cohen &
Garrett 2009).
Urban food security depends on households being
able to afford food within other needs that have to
be purchased (Cohen & Garrett 2009)—although as
noted above, the contribution of urban agriculture
is important for many households. Various studies
have shown the extent of food insecurity among
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coping measures taken, including those that in the
longer term compromise health and nutritional status
(see Maxwell et al. 1998; Tolossa 2010).
However, many Latin American and some Asian
and African nations that now have predominantly
urbanized populations have managed to sustain long-
term trends of falling infant and child mortality rates
and increasing average life expectancies, and this
implies improving nutrition levels too. In some
nations, the provision of a regular small cash sum for
low-income households (e.g. the bolsa familia in
Brazil) or the provision of certain staple foods at sub-
sidized prices has reduced hunger and malnutrition—
although with considerable differences in effectiveness
and in the possibilities for those who need this entitle-
ment to actually obtain it.
5. URBAN CHANGE, FOOD DEMAND AND
RURAL–URBAN LINKAGES
Perhaps surprisingly, the possible negative conse-
quences of urbanization for agriculture are often
stressed more than its positive consequences. Since
urbanization is generally the result of a growth in
non-food producers and their average incomes, it
often provides growing demands for agricultural
products and for higher value products that bring
beneﬁts to farmers.
Any discussion of the ways in which urbanization
may affect food demand and supply needs to take
into account the complexity of the linkages between
rural and urban people and enterprises, and to
recognize the capacity of food producers to adapt to
changes in urban demand (Tiffen 2003; Hoang et al.
2005).
A high proportion of households have rural and
urban components to their incomes and liveli-
hoods—so they are better understood as multilocal,
as individual members engage in different activities
in different locations while sharing resources and
assets. Incomes from non-agricultural activities and
remittances have proved important for reducing rural
poverty in many places (see Deshingkar 2006). Earn-
ings from non-farm activities are estimated to
account for 30–50% of rural household income in
Africa, about 60 per cent in Asia (Ellis 1998) and
around 40 per cent in Latin America (Reardon et al.
2001). Remittances from urban household members
and earnings from non-farm activities also have a
major role in ﬁnancing innovation and intensiﬁcation
of farming in Africa (Tiffen 2003) and in Asia
(Hoang et al. 2005, 2008). This is best documented
in rural areas with relatively good access to urban mar-
kets and infrastructure. In many cases, local traders
also contribute to the creation of non-farm jobs
through the local processing of agricultural produce,
and this helps diversify the economic base of large vil-
lages and helps in their gradual transformation into
small urban centres (Hoang et al. 2008).
Around half the world’s urban population live in
urban centres with less than half a million inhabitants,
and this includes a considerable proportion in urban
centres with less than 20 000 inhabitants. Small
urban centres in agricultural areas can have especially
important roles in the livelihoods of the poorest rural
groups by providing access to non-farm activities that
require limited skills and capital (Hoang et al. 2008).
They also have an important role in the provision of
basic services such as health and education to their
own population and that of the surrounding rural area.
Thus, migration and mobility should be seen as a
form of income diversiﬁcation that can support farm-
ing innovation and intensiﬁcation. Small family
farms, provided they are well connected to markets,
can often compete with large commercial farms,
especially in the production of higher-end food, such
as fresh fruits and vegetables.
6. URBANIZATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE
The multiple rural–urban linkages noted above mean
that climate change impacts on agriculture will affect
urban areas (for instance, inﬂuencing food availability
and price), and climate change impacts on urban areas
will affect agriculture (for instance, disruptions in
urban demand for agricultural produce and disrup-
tions to the goods and services provided by urban
enterprises to agriculture and to rural households).
Many rural households would also suffer if remittances
from family members working in urban areas were
disrupted by climate change-related impacts.
Hundreds of millions of urban dwellers are at risk
from the direct and indirect impacts of current and
likely future climate change—for instance, from more
severe or frequent storms, ﬂoods and heatwaves, con-
straints on fresh water and food supplies, and higher
risks from a range of water-borne, food-borne and
vector-borne diseases (Wilbanks et al. 2007). The
highest risks in urban areas are concentrated within
low-income populations in low- and middle-income
nations. In part, this is because most such nations
face impacts that are more serious than those faced
by high-income nations. But what is more signiﬁcant
for urban risks is very large deﬁcits in the infrastruc-
ture and services needed to protect urban inhabitants
from climate change impacts. This is underpinned by
a lack of capacity in most urban governments—and
in many, an unwillingness to provide infrastructure
and services in informal settlements, even when
these house 30–60% of a city’s population (as they
often do).
Thus, the climate change-related risks facing the
population of any urban centre are a function not
only of what climate change brings but also of the
quality of housing and the quality and extent of pro-
vision for infrastructure and services (see Revi (2008)
for a discussion of this in relation to India’s urban popu-
lation). Urban populations in wealthy nations take for
granted that a web of institutions, infrastructure, ser-
vices and regulations protects them from extreme
weather, and will keep adapting to continue protecting
them. This adaptive capacity is underpinned by build-
ings conforming to building, health and safety
regulations. In addition, it is assumed that city plan-
ning, land-use regulation, and building and
infrastructure standards will be adjusted to any new or
heightened risk that climate change may bring,
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investments (over time shifting from high-risk areas)
and changes in insurance premiums and coverage. At
least for the next few decades, this ‘adaptive capacity’
can deal with likely climate change impacts in high-
income countries (Wilbanks et al.2 0 0 7 ).
But most of the urban population in low- and
middle-income nations face (often very large)
deﬁciencies in all the institutions, infrastructure, ser-
vices and regulations noted above (Bicknell et al.
2009). This makes them very vulnerable as risks are
much higher, and a large and growing urban popu-
lation are exposed to such risks. This helps explain
why most deaths from extreme weather disasters are
in low- and middle-income nations, and the rapid
growth in the number of deaths and serious injuries
from such disasters in their urban areas. The impacts
fall most heavily on low-income groups and within
such groups on women and children (Enarson &
Meyreles 2004; Bartlett 2008).
Obviously, disasters disrupt food demand and
food supplies—and within urban areas, it is generally
low-income groups that suffer most as their income-
earning activities are disrupted and what little asset
bases they have are rapidly used—or destroyed by
the disaster. A high proportion of low-income
urban households—especially those reliant on wage
labour—are particularly at risk from climate change-
induced food shortages or staple food price rises
(Ahmed et al. 2009).
There is also the issue of climate change-induced
migration. There are predictions that by 2050 there
could be 200 million ‘environmental refugees’—
people forced to move by environmental degradation
caused by climate change (Myers 1997; Stern Review
Team 2006). But land degradation or decreases in
rainfall do not inevitably result in migration, or where
they do, most movement is short term, as in the case
of extreme weather disasters, and short-distance, as
in the case of drought and land degradation (Henry
et al.2 0 0 4 ; Massey et al.2 0 0 7 ). For slow-onset climate
change that has negative impacts on agriculture,
income diversiﬁcation and short-distance circular
migration are likely to be common responses.
Where climate change is causing environmental
stress for rural livelihoods, it will be one among a
number of factors in determining migration duration,
direction and composition. Agricultural adaptation
initiatives do not necessarily reduce rural–urban
migration; indeed, successful rural development
often supports rapid urban development locally as it
generates demand for goods and services from farmers
and rural households (Beauchemin & Bocquier 2004;
Henry et al. 2004; Massey et al. 2007; Hoang et al.
2008).
A failure to support rural populations to adapt will
mean crisis-driven population movements that make
those forced to move very vulnerable. Here, migration
is no longer a planned movement to an urban centre
helped by knowledge and contacts there. A consider-
able proportion of the urban poor in some African,
Latin American and Asian nations are those displaced
by conﬂicts and disasters. Most crisis-driven move-
ments may be unrelated to climate events but they
show how much these destroy livelihoods and create
vulnerable populations. A high proportion of these
people move to urban areas, leaving behind homes,
social networks and assets. It can take a long time to
insert themselves into local communities (who may
resent them as they compete for income sources).
Ironically, it will be a failure of governments and inter-
national agencies to support the poorer and more
vulnerable households to adapt (including the adap-
tation achieved by migration and mobility) and the
failure of high-income nations to agree to needed
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will
produce the crisis-driven migrations that those in
high-income nations currently fear.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Urbanization is often considered as having negative
impacts on agriculture—for instance, from the loss of
agricultural land to urban expansion and an urban
bias in public funding for infrastructure, services and
subsidies. But the scale of urban poverty suggests
little evidence of urban bias for much of the urban
population—and clearly, urban demand for agricul-
tural products has great importance for rural
incomes. Agricultural producers and rural consumers
also rely on urban-based enterprises for a wide range
of goods and services—including access to markets.
So the key issue is whether the growing and changing
demands for food (and other agricultural products)
that an increasingly urbanized population and econ-
omy brings can help underpin agricultural and rural
prosperity and sustainability within a global decline
in agricultural land area per person and water con-
straints. To this is now added the need to adapt to
the impacts of climate change that have the potential
to disrupt agriculture and urban demand, and the
urban enterprises that provide producer and consumer
services to rural populations.
The world’s level of urbanization is likely to con-
tinue increasing, as long as the long-term trend in
most low- and middle-income nations is for economic
growth. Among these nations, those with the most
economic success will generally urbanize most.
Higher income nations may no longer urbanize, but
this is largely the result of non-agricultural workers
being able to live in rural areas or industrial and service
enterprises located in rural areas.
Low- and middle-income nations with no economic
success will have little urbanization. In extreme crisis,
they may de-urbanize through an increase in the pro-
portion of the population working in agriculture,
forestry and ﬁshing. But this is only likely in nations
where parts of the urban poor still have the links in
rural areas that allow their reincorporation into rural
livelihoods.
With regard to climate change, it is difﬁcult to pre-
dict likely impacts because these depend so much on
whether global agreements rapidly reduce the drivers
of greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change miti-
gation presents many challenges to agriculture to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to better-off
urban dwellers to shift to less carbon-intensive diets
and lifestyles. A failure to reduce greenhouse gas
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asters with very serious impacts on rural and urban
populations. Many of the largest cities in low-income
nations are particularly at risk and at present lack the
capacity to adapt.
ENDNOTES
1Unless otherwise stated, the statistics for global, regional, national
and city populations are drawn or derived from statistics in United
Nations (2008).
2For most nations, this means 1990–1991 to 2000–2001; it will be
at least a couple of years before there is enough census data available
to show trends for 2000–2010.
3There may be some exceptions to this for certain high-income
nations, drawn from alternative ofﬁcial information sources.
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